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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are looking for a better life. You immigrate to a new
country and fourteen years later you become a citizen. You work, travel, go to
church, and perform humanitarian work for non-profit organizations like the
Red Cross. One day after reading the newspaper, you photocopy an article
describing a terrorist attack and then you are arrested. The Supreme Court of
your adoptive country finds the charges unfounded and orders you released, but
upon your release a peace-keeping force of a foreign government steps in and
arrests you. You are being detained without being charged and the only
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evidence against you is the copy of the article in your pocket and statements
from various unidentified "sources."'
This is what happened to Lakhdar Boumediene, a Bosnian-Algerian
national, who in late 2001 was arrested by local Bosnian police on suspicion of
plotting an attack on the United States embassy in Sarajevo.2 After a three-
month international investigation he was released for lack of evidence.3 Upon
his release, the United States military immediately transported him to
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, where he has been held ever since without being
charged with any crime.4 Since his arrest, Boumediene has been contesting the
basis for his detention in habeas corpus proceedings in U.S. courts. On June
12,2008, in Boumediene v. Bush,5 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the enemy
combatants detained at Guantinamo Bay have a constitutional right to file
petitions for habeas corpus in U.S. federal courts challenging the lawfulness of
their detention; that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) procedures for
review of their status "are not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas
corpus;" and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) "operates as
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.",
6
This article analyzes the likely effect of the Boumediene decision on the
approximately 265 current Guantinamo Bay detainees The discussion begins
with a brief overview of habeas corpus, its application during times of war, and
the assumptions generally made regarding the Suspension Clause. Then, the
article references a new "functional" test and applies the test factors to the facts
1. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE FOR THE ADMIN. REVIEW OF THE DETENTION OF ENEMY
COMBATANTS AT U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR 1-2 (Oct. 20, 2006), available
at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt-arb/ARB_ Round_2_Factors_900-1009.pdf#105 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2008) (listing the factors favoring Boumediene's detention, release or transfer).
2. Jackie Northam, Tapes Provide First Glimpse ofSecret Gitmo Panels, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Nov.
21, 2006, at 11, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyld=6514923 (last visited
July 31, 2008) (referring to the six Bosnian-Algerians arrested on suspicion of plotting to bomb the American
Embassy in Sarajevo). The six Algerians are: Belkacem Bensayah, Saber Lahmar, Mohamed Nechla, Mustafa
Ait Idir, Hadj Boudella, and Lakhdar Boumediene. Memorandum from Stephen Oleskey, Esq., Robert
Kirsch, Esq., Doug Curtis, Esq. & Melissa Hoffer, Esq. to the Office for the Admin. Review of the Det. of
the Enemy, Admin. Review Bds., U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Mar. 30, 2005) available at
http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/nov/bosniadetainees.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008).
3. Northam, supra note 2, 12.
4. Id.
5. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (consolidating matters of Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, and Al-
Odah v. U.S., No. 06-1196, both on certiorari to the same court).
6. Id. at 2240.
7. GlobalSecurity.org, GuantAnamo Bay Detainees, July 2, 2008, http://www.global
security.org/military/facility/GuantAnamo-baydetainees.htm (last visited July 7, 2008).
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in this consolidated case.' Further, the discussion presents the Boumediene
opinion on the judicial review shortcomings of the substitute for habeas corpus
as implemented by the United States during the war on terror. Next, the paper
will analyze the legal impact of the Boumediene decision on the Guant~namo
Bay detainees and others in a similar situation, as well as the likelihood of their
timely release. Finally, the article will present some of the questions left
unanswered by Boumediene decision and the vast latitude for its interpretation.
II. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE
Habeas corpus is an indispensable judicial "procedural mechanism" with
a dual purpose.9 First, it ensures that the executive branch of the government
cannot "impose detention except as authorized by law," and it seeks to maintain
a proper system of checks and balances that constrains government power while
allowing the government sufficient power to discharge its duties.'0 Second, it
protects citizens from arbitrary detention by having a court rule on the
lawfulness of their detention."
The system of checks and balances divides the power of the government
between the branches and establishes them so to prevent concentrations of
power. This system is achieved by separating the powers in such a way that
government duties and responsibilities would be carried out by the branch best
able to perform them. 2
For almost one hundred years since the adoption of the Constitution, the
writ was largely restricted to prisoners in federal custody. 3 When Congress
codified the habeas corpus as part of the post-Civil War Reconstruction, federal
8. Bourmediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59.
9. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War On
Terror, 120 HARv. L. REv. 2029, 2032 (2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The separation of powers as it relates to foreign territory is especially critical in determining
jurisdiction and is being addressed in the article. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (this landmark case established the judicial review process).
The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of,
and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply .... To
hold that the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at
will .... would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government,
leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say 'what the
law is.'
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
13. Fallon, supra note 9, at 2037-38.
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courts were granted review authority over claims of prisoners in state custody. 14
This authority has been interpreted broadly to allow the writ to be used to
challenge convictions or sentences in violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights where no other remedy was available.'"
Prior to the Boumediene ruling, the Supreme Court had never viewed the
writ to apply to aliens held abroad. In Eisentrager, a World War II case which
the Boumediene decision distinguishes, the Court held that habeas corpus did
not apply to German nationals detained by the U.S. Army in then U.S. occupied
Germany, or where the duration of the conflict at the time of trial was
unknown. 6
The Suspension Clause in the U.S. Constitution states that the "Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' 7 A strict textual
interpretation shows the great importance of the writ by making the writ
extremely difficult to suspend. The only circumstances justifying an
appropriate suspension of the writ is for the protection of the "public" or during
a "rebellion" or an "invasion". 18
Courts faced with habeas petitions, including the Boumediene Court,
confront jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive issues." Thejurisdictional
issues involve "the authority of a court to entertain a detainee's petition".2 The
procedural questions involve "the lawfulness of the administrative procedures
followed by the executive in classifying particular individuals as subject to
detention or in trying them for war crimes," as well as "the appropriate scope
of judicial review of decisions by executive officials or military tribunals".2 '
Other substantive questions, such as "whether the Executive has lawful
14. Id. Current Habeas Corpus Statute applicable to detainees in custody of the state seeking
remedies in federal courts is 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2008). The habeas corpus statute codifying the power
to grant the writ on September 11,2001 was 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (a),(c) (West 2000), and it is still valid with
its subsequent amendments, except for § 2241(e)(2) which has been held unconstitutional by
Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
15. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
16. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,781(1950). Unlike the German detainees in World War
IL the detainees at GuantAnamo Bay deny the allegations of acts of aggression against the United States, have
not been granted access to any tribunal, have not been charged with any wrongdoing, and have been detained
on territory over which U.S. has exclusive jurisdiction and control. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (The Suspension Clause).
18. Paul D. Halliday&G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts,
and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 583 (2008).
19. Fallon, supra note 9, at 2034.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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authority to detain particular categories of prisoners in the absence of trial
before an ordinary civilian court, '' 12 have not been answered by Boumediene.
m. THE NEW "FUNCTIONAL" TEST
The Boumediene Court introduced a new "functional" test to answer the
jurisdictional and procedural questions posed by the detainees' habeas petition:
whether the Guantinamo Bay detainees are entitled to habeas corpus and the
protections of the Suspension Clause 3 and, if so, whether the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) procedures and their limited review in federal court
are an adequate substitute to habeas corpus review.24
This new test, derived by the Court from the Eisentrager decision, lists
three factors the courts will employ in determining the extraterritorial reach of
the Suspension Clause (emphasizing the first two):
1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of
the process through which that status determination was made;
2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place;
3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's
entitlement to the writ.
25
A. Citizenship, Status, and Adequacy of Process
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the
President, as Commander in Chief, to issue military orders authorizing the
22. Id.
23. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
24. Id. at 2260.
25. Id. at 2259. The precedent cited is Eisentrager, concerning German nationals in custody of the
U.S. Army in Germany, convicted by military commission of having engaged in military activity against the
U.S. in China after surrender of Germany in World War II. The Court relied on the following paragraph of
the decision:
We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are
entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ
of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our
military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an
enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured
outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was
tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for
offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times
imprisoned outside the United States.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
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arrest and detainment of noncitizens suspected of terrorism.26 There has never
been a question that U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil have the right to habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court indicated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that a U.S. citizen
being detained in the United States as an enemy combatant is, as a matter of due
process, entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his classification [as an
enemy combatant] and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."" In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme
Court decided that the federal habeas corpus statute allowed non-U.S. citizens
detained as enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay to challenge the legality of
their detention in federal court in Washington, D.C.2" Noncitizens determined
to be enemy aliens may be detained at Guantinamo Bay,29 in the United
States,30 or elsewhere outside the United States.3' The Guantinamo Bay
detainees may also be categorized as challenging their detention3 2 and as
challenging their pending trial by military commission.33 These decisions only
prove that the citizenship of the detainee is not the determinative factor, but
rather must be considered with the status of the detainee and the adequacy of
process.
The status of the detainee is critical. According to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and its Additional Protocols,34 a prisoner of war designation would
26. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541(a) (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
The statute states:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. § 1541(a).
27. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
28. 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229 (mentioning that both detainees in this consolidated
case are non-citizens held at GuantAnamo Bay).
.30. See AI-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 708 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the detainee is held
at the Naval Brig, in Charleston, South Carolina).
31. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, In Courts, AfghanistanAirBase May Become Next Guantanamo,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at A14, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/28/
AR2008062801638_ lnform.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
32. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
33. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567-69 (2006).
34. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; [Collectively referred to as the Geneva Conventions]; Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]. The United States
is a signatory of these Geneva Conventions, but not Protocol I. See International Committee of the Red
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entitle a detainee held at a U.S. detention facility to habeas corpus relief at least
until his/her status is determined by a competent tribunal, whether the facility
is on U.S. soil or not.35 Likewise, a terrorist designation would allow the
federal criminal courts to try a detainee under anti-terrorism laws and would
entitle the detainee to habeas relief.36 Unlike these two designations, an enemy
combatant, unlawful enemy combatant, or other belligerent classification
provides limited protection for the detainee, depending on the definition
employed by the courts.
In July 2004, the U.S. Secretary of Defense established the CSRT to
determine whether the Guantfnamo Bay detainees were properly classified as
"enemy combatants" and to permit them an opportunity to rebut such a
designation.37 "Enemy combatant" is defined as an "individual who was part
of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,"
including anyone who has committed a belligerent act or has supported
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.3" Once detainees are assigned "enemy
combatant" status, their only recourse, absent habeas corpus relief, is to
challenge their status designation and, thus, the process determining their status
is of paramount importance.39
The process by which the status of the detainee is determined is next to be
evaluated. The CSRT order provides that each detainee shall be assigned a
military officer as a personal representative, who is neither an attorney nor the
detainee's advocate. 40 The personal representative may review any "reasonably
available" information in the Department of Defense's possession that may be
relevant to a determination of the detainee's enemy combatant designation, but
Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of.12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims oflnternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977- State Signatories, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsffWebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps-S, (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
35. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004); 42 U.S.C.A § 198 1(a).
36. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 102, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA]. The relevant habeas corpus sections of the law are amending scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Id.
37. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, for The Secretary of the Navy
(July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz], available at http://www.defenselink.miVnews/Jul2004/d20040707
review.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008). The currently applicable procedures can be found at Memorandum
from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Jul. 14, 2006) [hereinafter England],
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2OO6/d2OO60809CSRT Procedures.pdf(last visited Aug.
1,2008).
38. Wolfowitz, supra note 37, at (a).
39. See generally id.
40. See England, supra note 37, at Enclosure 3(D).
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may not share classified information with the detainee.4 Under the CSRT
process, GuantAnamo Bay detainees are given an unclassified description of the
factual basis for their classification as enemy combatants.42 The detainee is
allowed to call witnesses, if reasonably available, whose testimony is
considered by the tribunal to be relevant, but excludes members of the U.S.
Armed Forces if deemed unavailable by their commanders.4 3
If the detainee is determined by the tribunal to no longer be an enemy
combatant, the detainee will be transferred to be released to the detainee's
country of citizenship or other disposition consistent with international
obligations and the foreign policy of the United States.' Yearly,
Administrative Review Boards established by the Department of Defense
conduct a review of all Guant~namo Bay detainees to determine whether they
should continue to be held, released, or transferred to the custody of another
country.45
The Supreme Court found that the CSRT hearing process "falls short of
the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for
habeas corpus review,"'46 specifically due to the lack of a true advocate, the
inability to fully rebut government's evidence, the presumption of validity
given to the government's evidence, and the lack of complete appellate
review.47 The Court agreed with the detainees that, "even when all the parties
involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is
considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact."'4 In light of the
consequence of possible errors, the risk is too significant to ignore where
41. Memorandum from The Secretary of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status review
Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantanamo BayNaval Base, Cuba (Jul. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ d20040730comb.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
42. See England, supra note 37, at Enclosure 3(C)(4); Wolfowitz, supra note 37, at (3)(C)(4).
43. See England, supra note 37, at Enclosure I(G)(9).
44. Id. at (1)(9-10). See also Wolfowitz, supra note 37, at (i).
45. Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military
Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 1. Intro. (a), (c)
(July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/ d2006O8O9ARBProcedures
Memo.pdf [hereinafter ARB Memo] (last visited Aug. 1,2008). The Administrative Review Board assesses
whether the detainee is
... a continuing threat to the U.S. or its allies in the ongoing armed conflict against
al Qaida and its affiliates and supporters (e.g., Taliban), and whether there are other
factors that could form the basis for continued detention (e.g., the enemy combatant's
intelligence value and any law enforcement interest in the detainee).
Id.
46. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2270.
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detention of persons for the duration of hostilities may last a generation or
more.
49
B. Nature of Apprehension and Detention Sites
In early 2002, the government began imprisoning detainees at the
GuantAnamo Bay naval station in Cuba.5" In February 2002, almost
immediately, the first legal actions commenced.5' Based on the apprehension
site, the place in which they were captured, most GuantAnamo Bay detainees
fall into two categories: those apprehended on the battlefield, like Al-Odah,52
and those apprehended away from the battlefield or in unusual circumstances,
like Boumediene.
53
Being held at Guantinamo Bay, these detainees are being held outside the
United States, but in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary
control without claiming sovereignty.54 The location is a military base on
leased land in a sovereign nation." Under the lease agreement, reaffirmed by
treaty, the United States has complete jurisdiction and control over the land,
but recognizes the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over the leased areas.56
Both Boumediene and Al-Odah received CSRT hearings and both were
designated enemy combatants.57 Following the hearing, each detainee filed a
habeas petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia.58 In a similar
case, the Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions dismissing the cases for
lack ofjurisdiction59 and held that the habeas corpus statute60 extended statutory
habeas corpus jurisdiction to GuantAnamo Bay because the United States has
jurisdiction and control even though the location falls on sovereign territory.6'
49. Id.
50. See Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area; Military Unsure What Follows
Transfer to US. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at Al.
51. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (2002) (showing a filing date of Feb. 19, 2002).
52. Id. at 60-61.
53. See Northam, supra note 2.
54. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
55. See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and
Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter Lease Agreement], available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htrn (last visited July 31, 2008).
56. Id. at Art. III.
57. Bourediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
58. Id.
59. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. at 56.
60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2008).
61. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
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Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's ruling by enacting the DTA,
which states explicitly that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained ... at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba."62  Aside from
prohibiting the aliens' habeas petitions, the DTA further established that the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has "exclusive" jurisdiction to review
CSRT decisions.63 The jurisdiction question has been resolved by the
Boumediene decision. The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument
that the Constitution has no effect at Guantinamo Bay,' "at least as to
noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed sovereignty" '65 and held that
"there are few practical barriers to the running of the writ,"66 as the United
States has exercised complete control at Guantinamo Bay for over a century.67
C. Practical Obstacles in Determining the Petitioners'Right to Habeas
Corpus
The Boumediene Court did not place much emphasis on the practical
obstacles inherent in determining the petitioners' habeas corpus right.
Although the Court acknowledged costs associated with habeas proceedings
and compliance with the judicial process, and distinguished Eisentrager, it did
not find these concerns dispositive.6
62. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42
(2005) [hereinafter DTA] (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
63. DTA, § 1005(e)(3)(A).
64. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
65. Id. Although the U.S. has maintained complete and uninterrupted control of GuantAnamo Bay
for more than 100 years, the Government's view is that the Constitution has no effect there, at least as
pertaining to noncitizens, because the U.S. disclaimed formal sovereignty in its 1903 lease with Cuba. See
Lease Agreement supra note 55, at Art. Il.
66. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. By finding that Guantanamo Bay is subject to U.S. laws, the
ruling strips Guantanamo of its main reason to exist: holding detainees without lawyers and access to the
courts. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba (Dec.
28, 2001).
67. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
68. Id. at 2237. The Court distinguished Landsberg Prison in Eisentrager from GuantAnamo Bay
in Boumediene and found that Guantinamo Bay is not close to an active theater of war. Id. at 2260. But
see Justice Scalia's dissent discussing Eisentrager. Id. at 2294, 2298-302.
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IV. REVIEW PROCESS ADEQUACY AND HABEAS CORPUS SUBSTITUTE
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan ruled that the Military
Commissions for GuantAnamo Bay were unconstitutional69 and that the Geneva
Conventions did apply.70 The Court concluded that the DTA did not apply to
pending cases, including the one before the Court."' Further, the Court found
that the military commissions established after September 11, 2001 violated
Congressional restrictions placed on the use of military commissions,
interpreting Section 836 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as
requiring that military commissions be held to the same standard as courts-
martial, unless impracticable.72 As to Section 821 of the UCMJ, the Court held
that the "law of war" reference required compliance with procedural
requirements of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, because "conflict not of
an international character" means a conflict that is not between states and, thus,
encompasses even a cross-border conflict between a state and a non-state
terrorist organization.73
Interpretation is the pivotal issue. Unlike the Supreme Court, the White
House interpreted the phrase as not applying to the conflicts with Taliban and
al Qaeda because these conflicts are "international in scope. 74 It further
interpreted Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as not applying to al Qaeda
since al Qaeda is not a party to the Conventions, or to the Taliban soldiers in
Afghanistan because they did not comply with the requirements for prisoner of
war status under the Convention.75
Congress attempted to fix the shortcomings determined by the Supreme
Court in Hamdan by passing the MCA.76 The MCA establishes a new alien
"unlawful enemy combatant" status and defines an individual falling into that
category as someone who "has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is
part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)," or who, before, on, or after
the date of the MCA's enactment, "has been determined to be an unlawful
enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
69. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593-94.
70. Id. at 613.
71. Id. at 576.
72. Id. at 622.
73. Id. at 629.
74. Memorandum from The White House on Humane Treatment ofTaliban and al Qaeda Detainees
2(c) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bushmemo_ 20020207 ed.pdf (last
visited Aug. 1, 2008).
75. Id. at 2(a).
76. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (2008).
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tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of
Defense.""
The MCA acknowledges the Geneva Conventions several times. It states
that the newly coined "unlawful enemy combatants" cannot invoke the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights in habeas corpus or other similar
proceedings.7" It further states that military commissions are "regularly
constituted court[s]" satisfying the requirements set forth by Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.79
By far the most notable change instituted by the MCA is the amendment
of the habeas corpus statute. Although the MCA does not mention suspension
of habeas corpus, its changes have the effect of suspension. First and foremost,
the MCA is applicable to pending cases.80 It substantially modifies the review
process by limiting its availability only to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and for two strict purposes: review of the final decision
of enemy combatant status"' and whether the proceeding was consistent with
the standards and procedures, and to the extent applicable, the Constitution and
U.S. laws. 2
However, for the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an
effective and proper remedy in this context, "the court that conducts the habeas
proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the
CSRT proceedings." 3 This includes some authority to assess the sufficiency
of the government's evidence against the detainee. *" "It also must have the
authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not
introduced during the earlier proceeding." 5
The Boumediene Court decided that the purpose of the DTA and MCA is
to eliminate the habeas corpus option and to substitute it for a more summary
procedure.86 The Court did not state what procedure would be adequate, but
stated that the current procedure fell short of a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that Boumediene is "being held pursuant to 'the erroneous
application or interpretation' of relevant law. 87 Specifically, the Court found
77. Id. § 948a(1)(i)-(ii).
78. Id. § 948b(g).
79. Id. § 948b(f).
80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e).
81. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950g(a) (2008).
82. Id. § 950g(c).
83. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2266.
87. Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
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that the judicial officer must have the authority to make a determination in light
of the relevant law and facts, as well as the power to order release of the
detainee.88 Moreover, the detainees are not held pursuant to prior adversarial
proceedings before an independent and disinterested tribunal.89
Boumediene held that the CSRT procedures and the limited review process
available in federal court is not an adequate substitute to habeas corpus review
because the risk of error is too significant to ignore." As such, the MCA is an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of the
Suspension Clause.9 Therefore, petitioners are entitled to the habeas privilege
and if that privilege is denied to them, Congress must act in accordance with the
Suspension Clause's requirements.92
V. EFFECT OF THE DECISION
The Boumediene decision has had a major impact on the availability of
habeas corpus and other constitutional challenges to detainees, as well as the
likelihood of their release. It also significantly improves the international
credibility of the United States and its efforts to defeat terrorism.
A. Habeas Corpus Proceedings
The Boumediene decision is not a guaranteed release like the proverbial
get-out-of-jail-free card. The decision does not require that the detainees be
immediately released by having writs issued whereby ending their confinement,
or that they be transferred. However, the decision does give the detainees the
right to challenge the basis for their detention in habeas corpus proceedings in
federal courts. Until now, the only recourse available to the detainees was
challenging their enemy combatant status. The challenges available to the
detainees rest largely on whether the federal courts will choose a broad or
narrow interpretation of the Boumediene decision.93 Because the military
88. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
89. Id. at 2269.
90. Id. at 2270.
91. 1d. at 2274.
92. Id.; cf Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564. In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated that an "indefinite
imprisonment on reasonable suspicion is not an available option of treatment for those accused of aiding the
enemy, absent a suspension of the writ." Id.
93. Ruling on Def.'s Mot. Add'I Continuance, M 3, 6, U.S. v. Hamdan, D-042 (U.S. Mil.
Comm. June 26, 2008), [hereinafter Ruling] available at http'//www.defenselink.mil/news/D-
042%2OFinal%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
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commissions only havejurisdiction over unlawful enemy combatants, those not
designated as such will not fall under the commission's jurisdiction.94
Following Boumediene, some habeas corpus petitions will be eligible for
appeal and new petitions will be filed. A habeas corpus proceeding and any
substitute must afford the petitioner an effective and meaningful ability to
challenge his "enemy combatant" status, to challenge the sufficiency of the
government's evidence, and to present exculpatory evidence not considered by
the lower court.95 The Supreme Court found that the DTA fails to be an
adequate habeas corpus substitute, but it did not specify exactly what the review
process should entail in order to be procedurally sound.96
As opposed to criminal proceedings where secret evidence is not
permitted, the use of classified evidence in habeas corpus proceedings may be
allowed.97 The Court suggested that reliance on classified evidence may not be
objectionable because "the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting
sources and methods of intelligence gathering."98 If the detainee would have
the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence upon review, then the
reviewing court would have to have "some authority to assess the sufficiency
of the evidence against the detainee" in order to cure defects in previous
proceedings, such as reliance on testimony obtained under torture or coercion. 99
Further, the ability to rebut "the Government's evidence.., is limited by the
circumstances of his confinement and his lack of counsel .... 100
Additionally, the Court's finding was based on the fact that personal
representatives assigned to assist detainees during CSRT proceedings were
neither lawyers nor advocates and that the "Government's evidence [was]
accorded a presumption of validity."'' This presumption of validity of
evidence coupled with the inability of the detainees to rebut, and the reviewing
court's inability to assess the sufficiency of the evidence coupled with an
irrebuttable presumption of the detainee's guilt, accentuates the difference
between criminal proceedings and the proceedings under military commissions.
In its first case considering the merits of a petition to review a CSRT status
determination under the DTA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia found that the CSRT record was insufficient to support the
94. Jurisdiction was already denied by the MCA when it amended the statute to include cases
pending on or before the enactment of the amendment. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e).
95. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270.
96. Id. at 2240.
97. See id. at 2276.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2269.
100. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
101. Id.
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conclusion that the detainee was an enemy combatant, because the evidence the
government submitted to the Tribunal did not permit the Tribunal to make the
necessary assessment and, further, because the record does not permit the
review court to do so either. 0 2 The Appellate Court strongly held that Congress
did not direct them under the DTA to place a judicial stamp of approval "on an
act of essentially unreviewable executive discretion" when it authorizedjudicial
review of enemy combatant determinations.)13 This decision highlights the
grave "separation-of-powers issues raised by these cases" and emphasized in
Boumediene.io
B. Constitutional Challenges
The first criminal trial arising out of the war on terror and the first
interpretation of the Boumediene decision began on July 21, 2008 with U.S. v.
Hamdan.l°5 While the Court held that GuantAnamo Bay detainees are entitled
to constitutional protections, it did not specify the extent to which the
protections apply.'0 6 In Hamdan, the judge denied the defense's motion for
continuance, a motion largely based on the constitutional protections perceived
applicable by the defense after Boumediene."° The difference in interpretation
of the Supreme Court's ruling between the prosecution and the defense is
significant once again in anticipating the reach of the decision and its effect on
the pending and future cases of other detainees.
Relying on a broad interpretation of Boumediene, Hamdan's defense
alleged many violations of substantive and procedural constitutional protections
at Guantinamo Bay. Hamdan alleges that he is entitled to legal constitutional
protections and that any trial before a military commission violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' In addition, he alleges that:
coercion during interrogation violated his constitutionally protected right
against self-incrimination;'0 9 the use of testimony obtained by coercion or
torture and the denial of access to documents about Guantinamo Bay conditions
102. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
103. Id.
104. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263.
105. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
106. See generally id.
107. See Ruling, supra note 93.
108. See Def.'s Mot. Add'l Continuance 6(B), U.S. v. Hamdan (U.S. Mil. Comm. June 19,2008),
[hereinafter Motion], availableathttp://www.defenselink.mil/news/Motion%20for/2OCont.pdf(lastvisited
Aug. 1, 2008) (stating that "Because the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, like the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, protects persons as well as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege of
litigating in our courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles.").
109. Id. § (6)(B)(2).
2008]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
violated the Due Process Clause;" the restrictive access to high-value-
detainees at Guant~namo Bay violated his right to call witnesses in his
defense;"' the Guant~namo Bay conditions inhibiting attorney-client
relationships violated his right to an attorney; "2 the prosecution's plans to offer
"hearsay evidence" at trial violated his right to confront witnesses;" 3 the mode
and scheduling of military commission trials violated his right to a speedy and
public trial;" 4 being charged by Government prosecutors violated his right to
be charged by a grand jury;".5 and lastly, that he is accused of a crime for
actions not criminal at the time of occurrence, in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause."16
The government's contention is that the Boumediene holding is narrow and
means only that the detainees have the right to pursue habeas corpus petitions
in federal court and that preventing further delay is of great importance. "' The
government's main argument is that the cases are not analogous as Hamdan was
charged with war crimes while Boumediene was not. "' This argument is likely
to arise often as the detainees' circumstances vary greatly.
In denying Hamdan's motion for continuance, the judge found the
Supreme Court's holding in Boumediene to be narrow in that it did not hold
"that any other provision of the Constitution will protect the detainees at
GuantAnamo Bay."' 9 However, thejudge specified the commission's particular
interest in "the parties' views on whether other constitutional provisions, such
as those the defense intends to raise, apply at Guant~namo Bay."' 20 This could
be interpreted to mean that the Commission may interpret the narrow
Boumediene decision as applying broadly to other constitutional rights raised
by the detainees.
110. Id.
111. Id. § (6)(BX4).
112. Id. § (6)(B)(5).
113. Motion, supra note 108, § (6)(B)(6).
114. Id. § (6)(B)(7) (citing Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275, holding that aliens at GuantAnamo Bay
are entitled to prompt habeas corpus hearings and need not first exhaust procedures by seeking review of their
status as determined by the CSRT in the Court of Appeals).
115. Id. § (6XBX8).
116. See id § (6)(B)(9). The Ex Post Facto claim would be a test of whether a military commission
has jurisdiction because the accusations are not violations of the law of war.
117. See Petitioner's Response to Defendant's Motion for Additional Continuance, 5, U.S. v.
Hamdan, D-042 (U.S. Mil. Comm. June 20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news//Hamdan%20Gov 0/o20Response.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
118. Id.
119. Ruling, supra note 93, at 3.
120. Id.
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C. Likelihood of Release
Considering the Court's opinion regarding the government's evidence and
its presumption of validity without the possibility of rebuttal, the government
will likely evaluate the release of those detainees against whom little evidence
exists. To minimize the risk of error in detaining innocent people, the
government will evaluate the significance of the threat that the detainee is
currently posing and will likely release those presenting no further threat.
In evaluating the detainees' release, the government will have to consider
their citizenship, their immigration status in the country they wish to return to,
and the conditions in the country that will accept them. U.S. law prohibits the
government from sending people to countries in which they could be persecuted
or tortured; therefore, the U.S. government has the burden of finding countries
that will not further mistreat the detainees or that will not forward the detainees
to third countries engaging in such non-humanitarian practices. 2 '
D. United States' Credibility in the World
The Boumediene decision has already had a significant positive impact on
the credibility of the United States in the international arena as a nation
committed to due process and the rule of law. The Human Rights Watch found
the Supreme Court's ruling to command respect worldwide and herald it as a
"sign that the era of U.S. lawlessness in fighting terrorism is over."'22 The
world may now have a basis for believing that the U.S. military will follow
international laws regarding armed conflicts and treatment of prisoners in this
unconventional war, and that the U.S. efforts to defeat terrorism deserve
international support.
However, Boumediene does not prevent Congress from changing the
current MCA procedures. In line with the government's national security
concerns, a new system of preventive detention of individuals who are likely
to pose a threat may include the shortcomings found by the Supreme Court. In
the very near future, Congress may create new procedures governing detainee
review, as well as a national security court to conduct that review. The
legislature may define the burden of proof required in cases brought before
these courts and the categories of people detainable in light of the new rules
121. Some countries, such as Yemen, are refusing to accept former detainees by questioning the
legality of citizenship. Other countries pose a threat to the detainee and those detainees are awaiting the
acceptance of a third country. The situation is further complicated for those detainees who are immigrants
and cannot return to their native country, yet may not be accepted by their new country for lack ofcitizenship.
See Anthony Shahid, Yemeni Languishes at Guantanamo Long After US. Approved Release, WASH. POST,
June 13, 2007, at A 1l.
122. Human Rights Watch, US: Landmark Supreme Court Ruling on Detainees, June 12, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/12/usintl9l23.htm (last visited July 30, 2008).
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likely to be promulgated. Following the Boumediene decision, the courts will
show a level of deference to national security proportional to the opportunities
afforded the detainee to prove innocence before an independent decision maker.
VI. OPEN QUESTIONS
Although Boumediene resolved critical issues affecting the Guantdnamo
Bay detainees' legal recourses, the Court did not address other major questions
pertinent to the current conflict.
Specifically, the Supreme Court did not rule on the applicability of the
Constitution to detainees held outside of Guant~namo Bay, in similar detention
sites, with similar lease agreements, where the United States holds de facto
control, and where practical considerations do not forego extending the
protections of the writ.'2 3 Also, the Court did not state whether Guantdnamo
Bay should be closed, and left open the significant question of what law
governs a petitioner's detention or which international law governs the
authority of the United States to detain individuals not classified as terrorists
or prisoners of war.
The decision did not "address whether the President has authority to detain
these petitioners nor [did it] hold that the writ must issue. These and other
questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first
instance by the District Court."'24 The Supreme Court did not express an
opinion on the definition of enemy combatants, or the other designations used
by the government, and to what extent these definitions do not overlap with the
international belligerent descriptions.
The decision did not address whether claims regarding conditions of
treatment and confinement can be raised in subsequent habeas corpus proceed-
ings, nor did the Court specify whether existing military commission
proceedings must be stayed. Considering that the United States is at war, it is
significant that the Supreme Court did not specify the standards to be applied
during military operations or whether the rules of war need drastic
modifications to accommodate global wars on multiple fronts between non-
states.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Boumediene ruling creates a precedent for the exercise ofjurisdiction
over detainees in places where the U.S. government has the equivalent of
123. The U.S. Military prison in Bagram, Afghanistan has seen an increased number of detainees
over the years and there are plans to increase the capacity of the facility. See Del Quentin Wilber, In Courts,
Afghanistan Air Base May Become Next Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at A14.
124. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
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sovereign authority and for the detainee's ability to challenge U.S. custody
through a habeas petition.
As habeas relief is available only to those not yet charged with any crime,
with a certain status, and who can show that their detentions are not warranted,
it is unlikely that numerous habeas petitions will be initiated. Following its
previous reactions, Congress may yet again develop a new legislative way of
resolving most of the constitutional challenges. The new challenges will
present the Supreme Court with ample opportunities to interpret the
Boumediene decision.
Most importantly, Boumediene and other related cases may become a
valuable study of the checks and balances between the U.S. government
branches.
